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In this paper we seek to understand how firms learn about what adjustments they need to make in 
their  organization  structure  at  the  workplace  level.  We  define  four  organizational  systems: 
traditional (the simplest system), high-performance (the most complex system), decision-making 
oriented, and financial-incentives oriented (intermediate complexity). We analyze (1) the effects of 
learning-by-doing on adoption of more or less complex systems, (2) the shape of the performance-
experience learning curves associated with different systems, (3) the match between perceived 
organizational capabilities and the choice of systems, (4) the influence of other firms‘ systems and 
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1. Introduction 
The period from the early 1980s to the middle of the 1990s was characterized by rapid 
change, with rising globalization, heightened competition, political change, and rapid product and 
process  technological  change.  To  succeed  or  just  to  survive  in  this  environment,  many  firms 
adjusted their organization structure. At the level of the workplace, the change was frequently 
reflected  in  decentralization  of  decision-making  and  increased  reliance  on  financial  incentives 
(Appelbaum and Batt, 1994, Cappelli et al., 1997). 
Organizations  are  under  constant  competitive  pressure  to  improve  their  organization 
structure in order to get workers and managers to perform better. How to do better consists of many 
elements, two of which are central to understanding organizational change: identifying practices 
that impact behavior in desirable ways, and figuring out how to combine various practices to obtain 
maximum synergy among them. In a world of full and perfect information, unboundedly-rational 
managers would implement all available knowledge instantaneously and therefore organizations 
would always be in internal and external equilibrium. The large literature that documents change in 
actual organizations suggests that, in reality, managers struggle to figure out what works and how 
to implement change in their organizations, and that the process is often a protracted one. This 
process may be summarized as learning.   
There  is  a  substantial  literature  on  organizational  learning.
1  The literature identifies three 
dominant learning mechanisms. In learning-by-doing, decision-makers learn from their experience 
to improve their ability to operate a system (Yelle, 1979; Argote and Epple, 1990).  In matching, 
decision-makers extract information about their firm‘s capabilities or absorptive capacity to operate 
a particular system (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1995, 1996). In social or 
vicarious learning, decision-makers learn from observing the behavior of others (March, 1991, 
Haunschild and Miner, 1997; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995). 
In this paper, we investigate an original and unique dataset to test the influence of these 
learning  mechanisms  on  how  firms  adjusted  their  organization  structure  at  the  level  of  the 
workplace during the period of early 1980s to the mid-1990s. We define organization structure on 
the basis of decision-making and incentive practices, which we combine into four organizational 
systems: traditional (or simple, with centralized decision-making with fixed pay), high-performance 
(innovative  or  complex,  decentralized  decision-making  and  variable  pay),  and  intermediate, 
                                                 
1 For example, Ichniowski and Shaw (1995) study why older firms take longer to adopt new practices, Pisano, 
Bohmer and Edmonson (2001) and Edmondson, Winslow, Bohmer and Pisano (2003) analyze learning from 
organizations in the health care industry, Sorenson (2003) focuses on the effect of a firm‘s internal structure on 
learning outcomes among computer workstation manufacturers, Schwab (2007) looks at the relative impact of 
multilevel sources of information on adoption of an innovative managerial practice, and Rahmandad (2008) 
analyzes the impact of delays between actions and payoffs on learning in a simulated organization (earlier 
literature on organizational learning is reviewed by Argote, 1999).   3 
decision-making and financial incentives. We study firms‘ choices with respect to these systems: 
adding, shedding and keeping practices. In the middle of the 1990s, we surveyed all publicly-traded 
and  a  sample  of  privately-held  Minnesota  based  firms,  asking  them  to  provide  the  dates  of 
introduction  of  various  practices  concerning  the  group  and  firm-level  decision-making  and 
financial incentives, which we combined into the four systems.  
Figure 1 documents the significant decline in the proportion of firms with a traditional 
system and the rise in the proportion of firms that have a high-performance or financial incentives 
system. The figure reflects the cumulative result of the choices made by each sample firm over 
time, the choice being between continuation with the current organizational system and switching 
to another system. Table 1 summarizes these choices and shows the disposition of the 855 annual 
decisions  that  were  made  by  the  sample  of  publicly-traded  firms  between  1980  and  1994.
2  A 
majority of the firms (72.7%) had changed systems, with some more than on ce. Most transitions 
were from the traditional into the financial incentives system, and from financial incentives into the 
high-performance system. Since we do not observe learning directly, we examine  these choices-
transitions relative to various signals and information that management may have received prior to 
making these decisions in order to infer about the process and nature of learning. 
This is the first paper to evaluate a wide spectrum of variables and firm characteristics that 
influence learning  during the 1980s, a period of major transformation in firm organizatio nal 
structures. We allow for the possibility that firms learn in multiple ways and from multiple sources 
of information,  internal (accumulation of experience and changes in performance)  as well as 
external (industry-level adoption rates and average performance, distance to largest city).
3 We also 
examine the effects of different learning mechanisms on financial performance. A sizable literature 
has investigated the determinants of adoption of human resource systems, but our dataset permits to 
analyze the timing of adoption and its consequences on firm performance.
4 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we develop the conceptual 
framework for studying learning by organizations and offer the main hypotheses. In section  3, we 
                                                 
2 Most of the analysis in the paper focuses on public firms for which we have financial performance 
information needed for understanding the matching mechanism and learning curves. In an appendix, we 
present analysis of learning by-doing and social learning in private firms, where no financial information is 
required. 
3 Zimmerman (1982), Irwin and Klenow (1994), Henderson and Cockburn (1996), Thompson and Thornton 
(2001) and Schwab (2007) adopted a similar approach of simultaneously analyzing different sources of 
learning. They focused on the effects of learning from a firm‘s own experience relative to learning from its 
competitors. Our study extends their approach to include a larger set of learning mechanisms. Moreover, by 
analyzing firms in a cross-section of industries, our results generalize beyond single-industry or single-firm 
learning phenomena.   
4 The literature investigates why firms have certain organizational practices or systems and how these affect 
performance, rather than the process through which they come to adopt those practices; see, for example, 
Osterman (1994), Jones and Kato (1995), Ichniowski, Shaw, and Pernushi (1997), Cappelli and Neumark 
(2001).    4 
describe the data and in section 4 we detail our analytical framework and empirical strategy. The 
results  are  described  in  section  5,  and  in  section  6  we  conclude  with  a  discussion  of  the 
implications  of  our  findings  for  the  understanding  of  learning  by  organizations  as  well  as  for 
further research. 
 
2. Learning by Organizations: Discussion and Hypotheses 
The organization that succeeds in extracting better, smarter, and more economical effort 
from its employees will, ceteris paribus, perform better than other organizations. To accomplish 
this,  certain  management  practices  must  be  put  in  place  to  meet  an  organization‘s  needs  and 
capabilities. Because the payoff for doing things right in a competitive environment is high, and the 
penalty for doing things wrong is severe, organizations have an incentive to learn how to do things 
right.  Three  different  approaches  to  learning  have  been  developed  in  the  literature.  The  first 
approach emphasizes the accumulation of capabilities through experience; this is the learning-by-
doing theory. The second approach focuses on the accumulation of information about the firm‘s 
capabilities; this is the matching theory of learning. The third approach concentrates on how a firm 
observes what other firms do and draws inferences about what may be useful to emulate; this is the 
social  learning  theory.  The  mode  of  learning  and  the  combination  of  sources  from  which 
information  is  drawn  are  likely  to  depend  on  the  object  of  learning,  such  as  organizational 
structure. We develop the three approaches with reference to learning about organization structure, 
which we discuss briefly below before turning to the three learning mechanisms. 
2.1 Organizational structure in the workplace 
The allocation of decision-making and financial returns is considered in the economics-
inspired literature as the central element of organizational structure (e.g., Hart and Moore, 1990, 
Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995 and Brickley et al., 2007). Focusing on these elements, we distinguish 
among  four  organizational  systems  on  the  basis of their  reliance  on  employee  involvement  in 
decision-making through teamwork and similar mechanisms, and reliance on group or firm-level 
incentives such as group bonus, profit sharing, and employee stock ownership. The four systems 
are the traditional system, which entails centralized decision-making and fixed pay; the decision-
making system, which implements decentralization of decision-making via employee involvement 
but is associated with fixed pay; the financial incentives system, which relies on group and firm-
level  financial  incentives  but  not  employee  involvement  in  decision-making;  and  the  high-
performance system, which combines the decision-making and financial incentives systems. This 
classification is summarized in Figure 2.
5 Moving away from the traditional system entails a move 
to a more complex  management challenge. There are alternative ways of aggregating diverse 
                                                 
5 These four systems are equivalent to cells OA1-OA4 in Table 1 of Ben-Ner and Jones (1995).   5 
practices into systems; these four systems may be complemented by additional practices, such as 
total quality management, training, monitoring, employment security and more (Prendergast, 2002 
and Ben-Ner, Kong and Lluis, 2007); we discuss alternative categorizations of systems in section 
5.5.1. 
  The four systems differ in terms of the organizational capabilities necessary for their effective 
operation,  the  costs  of  operating  them,  and  the  benefits  that  stem  from  their  operation. 
Organizational capabilities concern a complex set of skills, know-how, and traditions that reside in 
many parts of an organization, in both management and workers, but cannot be observed directly 
(Nelson  and  Winter,  1982,  Chandler,  1992).  Organizational  capabilities  reflect  the  ability  of 
managers to select mechanisms for allocation of decision-making, incentives to induce employees 
and managers to act in the organization‘s interests and to put in place supporting practices such as 
training and organizational culture to promote a sense of duty and dedication to ameliorate free 
ridership in ways that cannot be accomplished with incentives alone (Kreps, 1990, Kandel and 
Lazear,  1993,  Ben-Ner  and  Jones,  1995).  Organizational  capabilities  reside  in  managers  and 
workers; training or replacement may enhance organizational capabilities, but the fact that hiring 
and training are commonly done by existing staff prevents significant transformation of a firm‘s 
capabilities,  resulting  in  a  nearly  fixed  level  of  organizational  capabilities.
6  Organizational 
capabilities also relate to the firm‘s absorptive capacity, the ability of a firm to recognize and 
assimilate the value of new information (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
The costs required to operate a system effectively rise with its complexity (Ichniowski and 
Shaw, 1995). The high-performance system is the most costly because it requires both investments 
in  training  to  enable  employees  to  make  sound  decisions  and  financial  resources  to  provide 
effective incentives. The decision-making and financial incentives systems entail lower costs than 
the high-performance system; it is impossible to rank these systems without specific operational 
and contextual details. The lowest-cost system is the traditional system. The magnitude of the 
benefits a firm can reap increases with organizational capabilities. Poor management can cause 
severe performance problems, and the more complex the system the more severe are the problems. 
In  contrast,  a  firm  possessing  superior  organizational  capabilities  can  take  advantage  of  the 
potential of the high-performance system and can generate a higher level of performance than it 
could from employing any other system. Thus in equilibrium a high-capability firm performs best, 
that  is,  generates  the  largest  net  benefits  with  the  high-performance  system,  whereas  a  low-
capability firm performs best when it employs the traditional system. The intermediate systems 
                                                 
6 In a study asking respondents in U.S. and Japanese semiconductor firms to rate the importance of different 
sources of information affecting decision-making, the most important source of information in both countries 
was colleagues in their own company (Appleyard, 1996).    6 
yield greater benefits when supported by appropriate organizational capabilities, which rank in 
between the levels required by the traditional and high-performance systems.  
The  decision-making  system  cannot  operate  effectively  without  the  complement  of 
financial incentives because self-interested employees and management may use their decision-
making power to pursue activities that benefit them rather than the organization (Levine and Tyson, 
1990).  Similarly,  a  financial  system  may  provide  appropriate  incentives  but  in  the  absence  of 
decentralization and delegation of decision-making employees and managers cannot act on their 
incentives. Only the high-performance system can take advantage of the complementarity between 
financial incentives and decision-making delegation; an intermediate system will perform worse 
than a high-performance system and possibly worse even than the traditional system (Ben-Ner and 
Jones, 1995, Appelbaum et al., 2000).  
Why  would  a  firm  adopt  an  intermediate  system?  The  process  of  transition  from  the 
traditional to the high-performance system entails not just the formal addition of incentives and the 
shifting of decision-making responsibilities to line employees, but also a complicated restructuring 
of myriad relationships among employees (Gant, Ichniowski, and Shaw, 2002). Firms with limited 
organizational capabilities or strong internal resistance to change will not make the transition in one 
leap; instead, they will move temporarily to an intermediate system, and then move on to the high-
performance system. This is compatible with the two-stage transitions observed in Table 1.  
2.1 Learning-by-Doing 
Arrow‘s (1962) seminal contribution focused on the role of experience on organizational 
productivity; subsequent investigations examined the process of introduction, implementation, and 
assimilation of new production technologies. A key argument of this literature is that the mastery of 
a new technique by an organization requires adjustments and learning by many individuals who 
participate in production. This process takes time, and the initial productivity of a new technology 
will be only a fraction of its full potential. The theory predicts, and empirical findings generally 
support, the existence of a learning curve that implies that the productivity of a new technology 
rises over a few years, then levels off (Epple, Argote and Devadas, 1991, Cabral and Leiblein, 
2001).  
Learning  from  experience  enhances  organizational  capabilities.  It  may  improve  an 
organization‘s ability to exploit more productively its current system, in line with the principal 
predictions of theory. Experience may also generate organizational knowledge that enables a firm 
to operate a more system than the firm‘s current system and thus be able to take advantage of its 
greater productivity. For a firm that accumulates knowledge that is transferable to more complex 
systems, as its capabilities grow over time, at some point they will reach the threshold level for 
switching to a more complex system.    7 
Learning-by-doing has implications for the dynamics of firm performance.  The typical 
learning curve exhibits an initial period of adjustment to the new system, after which productivity 
increases with experience but at a decreasing rate and eventually levels off. Firms with different 
capabilities accumulate experience at different rates, leading to different learning curves. Therefore 
the productivity profiles of firms with the high-performance system should be above the profile of 
firms  with  the  traditional  system  –  assuming  that  they  adopted  the  systems  that  match  their 
capabilities.
7  
The discussion above focused, for the sake of presentational convenience, on the traditional 
and the high-performance systems.  The discussion  can be extended  to the four systems. The 
decision-making and financial systems are more complex than the traditional system but less so 
than the high-performance one, but the two intermediate systems cannot be ranked and we will 
treat them as equally complex, and extend the predictions derived for the two sy stems to include 
the third intermediate possibility. Formally: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  The probability of switching to a more complex system increases with experience 
(H1a). Firm productivity increases with experience with a given system, but the rate of increase 
decreases over time (H1b).The productivity profile of firms matched with the high-performance 
system is above the productivity profile of firms matched with the less complex system (H1c). 
 
2.3 Learning About the Match Between a Firm’s Abilities and its System  
How  do  managers  learn  about  their  firms‘  ability  to  operate  different  systems?  The 
Bayesian  learning  literature  suggests  that  managers  have  some  prior  beliefs  about  their  firms‘ 
organizational capabilities and update them using signals they receive over time.
8 If the perceived 
capabilities exceed a certain threshold, management will decide to switch to a more complex 
system; otherwise it will stay with the current one.  Managers update their beliefs on the basis of 
signals they extract from observing previous performance: a switch to a more complex system will 
follow improvements in performance, if those are large enough to bring expected capabilities above 
the threshold for switching systems. Formally: 
                                                 
7 The idea that firms in the same industry vary in their learning rates was first illustrated by Dutton and 
Thomas (1984), documented across different plants of the same firm using the same technology by Chew, 
Bresnahan and Clark (1990) and by Pisano, Bohmer and Edmondson (2001) for cardiac surgery departments 
implementing a new technology. 
8 This literature was initiated by Jovanovic (1979) concerning worker mobility and later applied to firm behavior 
in Jovanovic (1982) and Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) and to firm choice of technology in Jovanovic and Nyarko 
(1996). This is similar to the idea of performance feedback, according to which firms adjust a given practice 
incrementally based on performance (Greve, 2003). Gibbons and Waldman (1999) analyze a model of learning 
based on time-dependent shocks in which promotion decisions arise following previous period improvements in 
worker performance.   8 
Hypothesis  2  (H2):  The  likelihood  of  switching  to  a  more  complex  system  increases  with 
improvements in performance. 
 
2.4 Social learning  
Firms  adjust  their  organizational  structure  not  only  by  looking  inward  at  their  own 
experiences, but also by learning effective management practices from consultants, colleagues in 
professional organizations, and academics, as well as observing the actions of other firms. Other 
firms‘ experiences may supply information or signals about the costs and benefits of systems with 
which managers do not have direct experience. In particular, managers of firms with the traditional 
system do not know precisely the costs and benefits of the high-performance system, and therefore 
do not know the threshold level of organizational capabilities that a firm must possess in order to 
make a successful switch. 
Managers may emulate other firms also to gain legitimacy with employees, customers, 
suppliers, and others on whom they depend (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Not all emulation is 
beneficial: managers may follow others in ―herd behavior‖ fashion at the expense of more relevant 
signals,  which  is  likely  to  result  in  inferior  performance  (Banerjee,  1992).  Learning  from  the 
experience of others may complement or even substitute for learning from one‘s own experience. 
The information  managers  seek  and  the  value  of  what they  learn  from  others  may  be 
correlated with their firms‘ abilities. Large firms enjoy economies of scale in collecting information 
about their environment. Firms located near other firms are better placed for networking with 
colleagues and others who possess useful knowledge than are isolated firms (Jaffe, Trajtenberg and 
Henderson, 1993, Beaudry and Breschi, 2003, Erickson and Jacoby, 2003). Firms located in or near 
large metropolitan areas usually have these advantages, as well as relatively easy access to sources 
of  information  -  conferences,  professional  enhancement  courses,  consultants,  academics,  and 
higher-quality managers and employees—compared to firms located farther away (Epple, Argote 
and Murphy, 1996, Audretsch and Lehman, 2005).  
Information pertaining to a firm‘s own industry is more valuable than information from 
other industries, which may have different economic and technological circumstances. A relatively 
simple indicator of what other firms do is captured by the  prevalence of firms using different 
systems. A richer (but harder to obtain) signal is the performance of firms with different systems, 
especially in a firm‘s own industry (Haundschild and Miner, 1997). Formally: 
 
Hypothesis 3. The likelihood of switching to a more complex system decreases with the degree of a 
firm’s isolation from other firms (H3a) and increases with the proximity to a metropolitan center 
(H3b). The likelihood that a firm will switch to a particular system increases with the proportion of 
firms  practicing that system  (H3c)  and  with  the  average  performance  of  firms  practicing that   9 
system  (H3d).  The  effects  are  weaker  when  the  system  proportion  and  performance  measures 
concern other industries as compared to the firm’s own industry (H3e).    
 
The three mechanisms may be used by the same firm as it seeks to learn about its own 
organizational capabilities and the costs and benefits of alternative systems, and from its own 
experience. The hypothesis testing in the next section allows explicitly for this possibility. 
3. Data and Variables 
3.1 The Dataset 
We assembled a rich dataset concerning more than 800 privately-held and publicly-traded 
firms. The variables used in the analysis are summarized in the Appendix, where a discussion of 
sample  size  differences  across  various  estimations  is  also  provided.  For  coherence  and 
completeness of analysis, we focus our attention on the sample of publicly-traded firms for which 
we have financial information, our performance outcome. We replicated the analysis for the full 
sample of firms and report the main results but do not include them in the paper (they are available 
upon  request).  The  description  of  the  dataset  below  focuses  on  the  publicly-traded  firms.  We 
obtained data on various management practices, unionization status, geographic location, and other 
firm characteristics from the Minnesota Human Resources Management Practices Survey. Wage 
and  employment  data  come  from  the  Minnesota  Department  of  Economic  Security‘s 
unemployment insurance (UI) files, and financial data from Standard and Poor‘s Compustat.  
The  survey  was  administered  in  1994  to  all  publicly-traded  firms  with  at  least  20 
employees  that  were  headquartered  and  operated  in  the  state  of  Minnesota.  The  survey  was 
conducted by mail, with a phone survey administered to firms that did not respond. The overall 
response rate was 61% (177 firms), a rate that exceeds that of most similar surveys. The survey 
asked  for  information  about  current  practices  in  the  responding  firms  as  well  as  retrospective 
information regarding the dates of introduction and discontinuation of various practices.
9 For each 
responding firm we thus had variables indicating the presence or absence of various human 
resource  practices  over  time  as  well  as  the  introduction  and  disconti nuation  dates,  where 
applicable, of these practices.
  For  each  firm  we  merged,  when  available,  financial  data  from 
Compustat  and  employment  and  average  wage  data  from  UI  files.  Because  the  UI  data  were 
available only from 1980 on, we confined our analysis to the period from 1980 to the year of the 
survey, but when we use experience variables (how long a practice was in place), we employ the 
actual date when a practice was introduced, even if that was prior to 1980. The sample period is 
                                                 
9 Respondents were typically the highest human resources executive in the firm; in smaller firms the 
respondent was frequently the top executive in the firm. We debriefed several respondents about how they 
obtained retrospective information about dates of introduction and discontinuation of practices; we were told 
that it came mostly from company records or their colleagues‘ recollections.    10 
therefore 13 years (the use of lagged changes in firm performance implies that we lose two years of 
data). Our panel dataset is anchored in the year of the survey and its size gets smaller the further we 
go back away from 1994.
10 Among the 110 firms with all the requisite data (as compared to the 177 
responding firms), there were 39 firms in 1980, with others having been established in later years. 
Firms may enter and exit the sample relative to the annual availability of financial data  (ROI, the 




We  constructed  the  dummy  variables  that  represent  the  four  systems,  the  key  dependent 
variables in this paper, as follows. The variable that represents the system that entails employee 
involvement in decision-making (D) is coded 1 in year t if the firm had at least one of the following 
employee  involvement  programs  in  that  year:  quality  of  working  life  teams,  quality  circles, 
autonomous work teams, joint labor-management teams, or employee representatives on the board 
of directors. The variable that represents the financial incentives system (F) is coded 1 if the firm 
had at least one of the following: an employee stock ownership or purchase plan, a current or 
deferred profit-sharing plan, a gain-sharing plan, or a group bonus plan. The high-performance 
system (H) was coded 1 if the firm had both F=1 and D=1, whereas the traditional system (T) was 
coded 1 if the firm had both F=0 and D=0.  
In terms of system changes, 72.7% of firms (80 out of 110 firms) experience at least one 
system switch. Table 1 provides the number of potential and actual transitions across systems 
(where the unit of observation is firm-year). About 90% of the potential transitions entailed a 
decision to stay with the current system. Most of the actual transitions represent switching from the 
traditional  system  to  the  financial  incentives,  decision-making,  and  high-performance  systems, 
followed by switches from the financial incentives system to the high-performance system. The 
high-performance system is the most stable one, with only five moves out of it, none of which are 
to the traditional system.  
Multiple variables were used to characterize the different learning mechanism. For learning-
by-doing,  we  use  information  on  the  number  of  years  of  experience  with  a  system  (including 
experience prior to 1980, as this variable does not require wage or employment information). It is 
important to keep in mind the differential effects of time and experience when modeling the effect 
of learning-by-doing with a system on decisions to adopt more complex systems. Experience with a 
system can start only when the practices that define it become available. The innovative practices 
                                                 
10 Some of the firms that went out of business before the 1994 survey were likely poor performers who, among 
other things, did not adjust their systems as well as surviving firms. Hence analysis of adjustment by survivors 
will likely show a stronger pattern than that of non-survivors.    11 
became available in early to mid-1980s, which is when our sample period starts. As a result, the 
system with which firms have most experience is, of course, the traditional system, whereas the 
high-performance system, being the most recent, has been in use least. All our estimations include 
year effects and control for firm age to capture the effect of time independently of the system 
effects. For matching, we use the lagged difference in relative returns on investment (ROI). To 
compute the relative returns, average ROI in the firm‘s industry was subtracted from the firm‘s 
own ROI. We use the one digit SIC industry classification to define industries.  
For  social  learning,  we  use  a  firm‘s  total  distance  to  other  firms  as  a  measure  of  its 
isolation and networking opportunities.
11 To capture opportunities for learning from other sources 
as well as for networking, we use a firm‘s distance to downtown Minneapolis. Minneapolis is the 
state‘s main metropolitan center, where several important institutions that provide opportunities for 
networking or transfer of knowledge are located. We characterize information about other firms‘ 
systems by computing the prevalence (distribution) of systems and the average performance of 
firms by system in a firm‘s own industry, as well as in other industries. Firms may rely more on 
information about firms that are more similar to them, so we created these two measures also for 
firms with similar size, age, and similarly located within 10 miles of Minneapolis.
12 
In our analyses we control for  firm size, industry and  unionization status.
13 We also use 
information about firm average real wage to control for firm heterogeneity; to deal with potential 
endogeneity, we use a firm‘s average real wage only in the year the firm entered the sample.  
The system variables are based on retrospective data. The use of retrospective data may 
cause two kinds of recall errors: memory effects (forgetting that some events took place) and 
telescoping  effects  (incorrectly  placing  an  event  on  the  time  axis).  Forward  telescoping  (i.e., 
reporting  an  event  as  occurring  closer  to  the  survey  time  than  was  actually  the  case)  usually 
prevails because subjective experience of time is shorter than actual time. This implies a downward 
bias in the reported length of spells in progress at the time of survey (Torelli and Trivellato, 1993). 
Measurement errors in the dependent variable of either kind will not bias our analysis of learning 
about the match and learning from others, where switching is the dependent variables because the 
distortion process is random and is not likely to be associated with firm characteristics (firm size, 
industry, and various practices that were in place at the time of the survey). Analysis of learning-
by-doing involves the use of experience with a system and therefore it is likely to be affected by 
                                                 
11 The total distance from other firms reflects only firms in our dataset. This may not be fully representative of 
the actual distribution of firms across the state and therefore of the true networking opportunities each firm 
faces. The variable indicating total distance from other firms is therefore likely to be a biased measure of the 
extent of firms‘ isolation. 
12 We used three categories for firm size (less than 99 employees, 100–499 employees, and 500 or more 
employees) and four categories for firm age (less than 4 years, 5–10 years, 11–20 years, and above 20 years). 
13 To minimize the number of right-hand side variables, industry controls are based on a broader definition of 
industry (service, trade and manufacturing) than the one digit SIC classification.    12 
telescoping effects (Torelli and Trivellato, 1993).
 The associated estimates presented therefore may 
suffer from a downward bias, which makes it more difficult to capture learning-by-doing effects 
and therefore easier to reject H1.  
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
Learning is not observable; we can only identify the consequences of learning, the presence 
or absence of system change at a given point in time as well as  changes in performance. Our 
estimation strategy regarding system change is based on a latent variable framework in which the 
latent variable represents the year-to-year net benefits of system adjustments. We make inferences 
about the net benefits associated with a system change from the observation of a firm‘s decision 
whether or not to change its system in a given year. Learning is captured empirically through 
variables that reflect the extent of a firm‘s knowledge of the current and other available systems as 
well as of its own capabilities to operate the systems. In the learning-by-doing framework, learning 
about the system‘s specificities is reflected in a firm‘s accumulated capabilities to run its current 
system; these capabilities are assumed to be perfectly observed. The matching and social learning 
frameworks introduce imperfect information, and learning consists of firms‘ usage of signals to 
make inferences about imperfectly observable variables, their own organizational capabilities, and 
the systems‘ costs and benefits. In addition, we estimate productivity profiles as a function of 
system experience to test for the existence of a learning curve. 
The three approaches to learning describe learning mechanisms that many firms are likely 
to use concurrently. An estimation framework of a firm‘s decision to adjust or keep a system that 
combines or nests the three mechanisms may be written as follows: 
 
P(St|S’t-1) = F(expts) + βΔyjt-1  + 1 INothers at t-1 + 2 IPothers at t-1 +  3 log(1+ Distcity)) + εt ,         (1) 
 
where St is the new system and S‘t-1 is the previous system, F is a non linear function of experience 
with a system reflecting the learning-by-doing effect, β corresponds to the matching effect, and the 
social learning effects are represented by 1, the effect of previous-period information about the 
distribution of firms INothers, 2, average performance by system IPothers ,
14 3,the effect of the distance 
of the firm to Minneapolis
15, and  εt is a random noise. 
We  implement  this  general  framework  in  two  ways,  balancing  generality  with  data 
restrictions. We first estimate the likelihood of a change to a more complex system (from T to F, D, 































, where N is the number of firms at t-1, y is firm productivity, j 
indexes the industry, and s indexes the system of firms in industry j at t-1. 
15 We also used Distothers, the sum of the distances of the firm to other firms as well as DistSysH, the sum of the 
distances of the firm to other firms with the high-performance system.   13 
or H, or from F and D to H) versus the alternative of no change in system or change to a less 
complex  system,  against  the  variables  listed  in  equation  (1).
16  In  this  logit  estimation,  the 
probabilities  of  adjusting  systems  are  independent  of  a  firm‘s  current  system.  The  results  are 
presented in Table 2. We next investigate the different learning effects by estimating conditional 
probability frameworks by the type of a firm‘s current system. Learning effects may depend on a 
firm‘s current system, and the learning mechanism on which a firm relies more may also be a 
function of its current system. For example, firms with the traditional system may learn more from 
their own experience than firms that have already adopted a somewhat complex system (D or F), 
and learning about a firm‘s own capabilities may be more important for the decision to switch out 
of T than learning about costs and benefits of a system by observing other firms‘ information. We 
perform multinomial estimations of the likelihood of switching out of T either into D or F, and logit 
estimations for the likelihood of switching out of D or F into H.
17 Results are presented in Table 3.  
For evidence of a learning curve implied by learning-by-doing, we estimate and test for the 
concavity of productivity profiles as a function of experience with a given system; we regress firm 
performance as measured by a firm‘s ROI on a quadratic function of system experience, controlling 
for industry, union, and firm size. Firm heterogeneity and matching effects on the learning curve 
are handled by comparing the profiles of firm performance across systems. To take into account the 
compositional bias in the estimation of the performance profile for a given system caused by the 
fact that firms adopt or switch out of that system at any point in time, we perform the estimations 
only on the sample of firms that did not experience a change in system during the sample period as 
well as on observations after switching to a new system. The non-changers (i.e., firms that report 
the same system since 1980 or since they entered the sample if born after 1980) and the post-
change  firms  are  assumed  to  be  matched  correctly  with  their  system  The  significance  of  the 
quadratic term provides evidence in favor of the concavity of the learning curve, and significant 
differences in the slopes of the profiles across systems would indicate the importance of the effects 
of matching organizational capabilities to systems. Results are presented in Table 4 and Figure 3. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Learning-by-Doing, Matching, and Social Learning  
The results in column (1) in Table 2 show that the marginal effect of experience with a 
given system is to reduce the likelihood of switching to a more complex system, with a negative 
estimated slope and positive quadratic term. The effect is significant for the F system; the effect for 
                                                 
16 As Table 1 indicates, very few changes are made to a lower-complexity system, so these cannot be 
evaluated separately. 
17 A multinomial estimation is not possible in this case because of the small number of transitions out of 
systems D or F down to system T.   14 
D is similar but less precisely estimated, and the effect for the T system is still weaker. The U-
shape pattern implies that experience with a given system starts to have a positive effect on the 
likelihood  of  switching  after  a  few  years.  It  takes  12  years  of  accumulated  experience  for 
experience with T to increase the likelihood of switching to a more complex system, while it takes 
only  5.9  years  for  experience  with  F  and  three  years  for  experience  with  D  to  increase  the 
probability of a system switch. It therefore takes a while for a firm to accumulate expertise that 
enables it to operate a more complex system. The time required to develop such expertise depends 
on a firm‘s current system: it takes longer to be ready to switch out of T than from D or F. These 
results imply that hypothesis H1a is supported.  
The result in column (2) suggest that previous-period changes in performance increase the 
likelihood of switching to a more complex system; past improvements in a firm‘s performance 
seem to be a good predictor of the firm‘s capabilities and therefore of the decision to adopt a more 
complex and better-performing system, as predicted by hypothesis H2.  
The estimates on social learning variables are in columns 3 and 4. Greater distance from 
Minneapolis as well as greater distance from other firms reduce the likelihood of switching to a 
more complex system (columns 3a and 3b), in line with hypotheses H3a and H3b. Information 
about the distribution of the four systems in general as well as in cells with similar industry, age, 
size, and location has no significant effect on a firm‘s likelihood of switching to a more complex 
system,  contradicting  H3c.  Information  about  firms‘  average  performance  under  the  H  system 
increases the  likelihood  of  adopting  a  more  complex  system,  as  predicted  by  hypothesis  H3d. 
However, information about the F system‘s performance contradicts this hypothesis, as does (more 
weakly) information about the D and T systems. In column 4c, we use the system distribution and 
performance measures from firms in industries outside the firm‘s own industry. Compared to the 
measures based on the same industry as in column 4a or similar industry, age and location as in 
column 4b, none of the effects are significant for explaining firms‘ switching decisions. In addition, 
the value of the LR statistics shows a poor fit of this model specification with the data (p-value of 
.13). Together, these results are consistent with the idea that social learning effects are stronger 
when information is drawn from firms more similar in production technology as opposed to firms 
in different industries (H3e).  Thus social learning seems to operate through favorable information 
from similar firms about performance effects of the H system, and better-located firms appear to 
learn to switch to a more complex system more often than their counterparts in faraway places. 
The last two columns of Table 2 examine jointly the three learning mechanisms. Column 
(5a)  corresponds  to  social  learning  variables  as  specified  in  column  (4a),  and  column  (5b) 
corresponds  to  the  specification  of  column  (4b).  For  space  reasons,  we  show  the  results  with 
distance  to  Minneapolis  variable;  the  other  distance  variable‘s  effects  were  similar  to  those   15 
estimated in columns (3) and (4) with slightly weaker significance levels. The combination of all 
the variables associated with the three learning mechanisms does not reduce their individual effects 
(except for the distance variable). This suggests that the mechanisms have complementary roles in 
explaining firms‘ decisions to switch to a more complex system.  
These results are based on the sample of publicly-traded firms, and the results might not 
generalize to privately-held firms. To investigate this possibility, we replicated the logit estimations 
from the analysis in Table 2 for the full sample including privately-held firms (the results are 
available upon request). We find that the learning effects we could estimate (learning-by-doing and 
social learning, since matching involves the use of the financial performance measure ROI), are 
similar in terms of the sign of the estimated coefficients. The effects, however, are smaller. We also 
find that the dummy variable indicating whether the firm is publicly traded has a positive and 
significant  effect  on  the  likelihood  of  switching  to  a  more  complex  system.  A  comparison  of 
average  characteristics  for  the  full  sample  and the sample  of  publicly-traded firms  shows that 
privately-held  firms  are  on  average  older  and  smaller,  as  well  as  located  farther  away  from 
Minneapolis (see Appendix A ). These results suggest that privately-held firms tend to be more 
traditional and conservative; they may be less prone to adjustments in their organizational system 
and therefore are less sensitive to learning opportunities. 
 
5.2 Learning Mechanisms by Current System  
   Table 3 presents results of a multinomial analysis for firms with the T system considering the 
decision to stay with it or to switch to the D or F system, or to the H system, and results of a logit 
analysis for the decision to stay with or to switch from the D and F systems into H.
18 
In the case of learning-by-doing, there is no significant effect of experience with T
19 on the 
likelihood of switching out of it, neither to D or F nor to H.  Consistent with the results in Table 2, 
H1a is not supported for  T. For firms that have already the  D or F  system, the likelihood of 
switching to the H system (right panel) is affected significantly by experience with  D and F (no 
significant effect of experience with  T). This result is consistent with the evidence for computer 
manufacturers that learning-by-doing with T does not have an effect on switching decisions  but 
learning-by-doing with D or F does (Sorenson, 2003). Similar to the results in Table 2, it takes 3.47 
years for experience w ith  D  and 2.38 years for experience with  F  to lead to a switch to H. 
Hypothesis H1a is thus strongly supported for experience with F and weakly for experience D.  
                                                 
18 As noted earlier, switches to and from D and F were combined because we do not have information about 
their relative complexity and because the number of observations in each is too small for statistical analysis. 
There is only one transition from D or F to T, and we combined that observation with the observations 
reflecting no changes in system. 
19 With one exception, all the firms with T have always had that system, so for those firms, experience with 
the system corresponds to their age. These firms did not have experience with other systems, so the left panel 
presents estimates only on age cum experience with the traditional system.   16 
Past changes in performance have no significant effect on the decision to switch out of the 
T, but do for switching from the D and F systems into the H system. These results suggest that 
improvements in past performance serve as a signal of greater capabilities only for firms that have 
already implemented an intermediate system. The matching results in Tables 3 and 2 are not robust 
to the inclusion of average real wage in the estimations. If average real wage proxies for firm-
specific heterogeneity, it may capture variations in capabilities. As a result of its inclusion, there 
may be no more variation left to be explained by past performance changes that also reflect firm 
capabilities.  
For social learning, distance to Minneapolis has a negative effect on the likelihood of 
switching out of T to D or F but not to H. The coefficient is of similar magnitude as the one 
estimated in Table 2 but the standard error is much larger due to the drop in sample size. Distance 
to Minneapolis has no significant effect on the likelihood of switching to H from D or F (second 
column of Table 3).  This suggests the possibility that distance away from sources of information 
about how to use the H system leads firms to be more cautious and to make adjustments in stages, 
moving first to an intermediate system and only later to the full H system.  
The distribution of systems in a firm‘s own industry does not have a statistically significant 
effect on the decision to switch from T to either D or F or to H. However, the performance of firms 
in a firm‘s own industry does have an effect on the switch from T to H but not to the intermediate 
systems.  Specifically,  the  better  the  average  performance  of  firms  using  H,  the  greater  is  the 
likelihood of switching to it.
20 
Firms with the intermediate systems (last column of Table 3) do not seem to be influenced 
in their decisions by distance variables, perhaps because the influence of these variables was 
already exercised in the switch from the traditional system to the current system. However, a 
sizeable effect is measured on the performance of firms with H, albeit without a lot of precision. 
 
5.3  Learning Curve 
Table 4 presents the results of OLS estimations of performance measured as the firm‘s ROI 
as a quadratic function of a firm‘s years of experience. These analyses are conducted for the sample 
of firms that did not experience a change in system, and for observations following the change to a 
new system for those firms that did switch systems.
21 The resulting learning curves—predicted 
profiles  using  these  estimates—are  illustrated  in  Figure  3.  The  coefficients  associated  with 
                                                 
20 A more detailed look at the data, including information about the firm‘s location, age, size, in addition to 
industry, as we have done in column (6) of Table 2, was not feasible here (recall that we are controlling here 
for firms‘ current system). 
21 For the decision-making system there are no observations of non-changers and there are very few 
observations of changers, so system D was not included in this analysis. The results of the analysis with a 
cubic function of experience are not shown, as the cubic terms were not significant.   17 
experience  with  T  are  not  significant,  and  the  learning  curve  is,  of  course,  flat.  The  slope 
coefficients for the H profile are significant at the 5% level, and their sign is consistent with a 
concave  learning  curve  as  stated  in  hypothesis  H1b.  The  coefficients  associated  with  the 
performance profile of F are also significant at the 5% level. The predicted performance profile is 
convex  with  an  original  decrease  in  performance  and  an  increase  after  about  11  years  of 
accumulated experience. This conforms with our hypothesis that, in contrast to H, this system is 
unbalanced and firms that adopt it find it difficult to make it work, causing a fall in performance 
with  very  slow  recovery.  The  comparison  of  the  performance  profiles  across  systems  also 
emphasizes  the  importance  of  the  matching  effect,  as  the  H  profile  stands  above  the  others 
(hypothesis H1c). 
 
5.4 Summary of Empirical Results Relative to Theoretical Hypotheses  
We find evidence in favor of hypothesis H1a that learning-by-doing increases the likelihood 
of switching to H for the D and F after a minimum of accumulated experience, but not so for T. We 
find strong evidence of learning-by-doing effects for firms in the H system, consistent with the 
learning curve hypothesized in H1b; we do not find evidence of learning from experience for the T 
system, and for the F system we find that its adoption is associated with a decline in productivity. 
The latter finding suggests that organizational capabilities honed in predecessor systems (mostly T) 
do not help with running F. This is also consistent with H1a in that accumulated experience with F 
increases  not  only  organizational  capabilities  but  also  the  need  to  switch  to  a  more  balanced 
system. The results are also indicative of the importance of matching effects as stated in H1c.  
We find evidence that improvements in performance influence a firm‘s decision to change to a 
more complex system, consistent with the matching hypothesis (H2). For social learning, we find 
some evidence for hypothesis H3a concerning the effects on learning associated with a firm‘s 
isolation and find stronger evidence for H3b for the impact of the distance to the metropolitan 
center. There is some support for H3d and H3e related to the role of information on other firms‘ 
average  performance  by  system;  the  results  are  weaker  when  we  use  measures  based  on 
information for firms similar in size, age, and location to the firm under analysis, but this may be 
due to the sensitivity of these measures to the categorization used and the definition of the cells, as 
well as the small number of observations in each of the detailed cells.  
 
5.5 Robustness Checks  
5.5.1 Alternative Specification of Systems 
Our  characterization  of  organizational  systems  is  based  on  a  parsimonious  and 
theoretically-driven approach. The financial incentives (F) and decision-making (D) systems we 
use cover a wide range of workplace practices, but exclude other practices such as TQM, training,   18 
job rotation, promotion from within and employment security These practices may be regarded as 
practices that support or complement allocation of decision-making and financial incentives and we 
group them into a third category of supporting practices (S) in a similar way to the construction of 
the D and F systems. This generates eight systems - T, D, F, S, D&F, D&S, F&S, D&F&S – 
instead of the four systems we used thus far.  
We  replicated  the  analysis  in  Table  2  with  the  eight  systems  (computing  experience 
variables  and  system  distribution,  and  average  firm  performance  by  system).  We  define  the 
dependent variable as a switch to a more complex system for changes from: (a) T to any other 
system, (b) the single dimensional systems (D, F or S) to the two-dimensional ones (D&F, D&S, 
F&S) or to the  three-dimensional system (D&F&S), and (c) the two-dimensional to the three-
dimensional system.  
The results, available upon request, are qualitatively similar for learning about the match 
and social learning based on networking but weaker for the effects based on variables interacted 
with systems (experience with a system and performance under a system). For learning-by-doing, 
the intermediate system S has a U-shaped effect on the likelihood of switching to a more complex 
system similar to the effect associated with experience with system F in Table 2; a similar but 
weaker effect is found for the D&S and F&S systems. The intermediate system D&F (H, but 
without supporting practices) has a strong positive linear effect on switching to a more complex 
system. For learning about the match, the effect is the same as in Table 2. For social learning based 
on  system  distribution,  the  proportion  of  firms  in  the  financial  incentives  system  significantly 
reduces the probability of switching to a more complex system and none of the other variables, 
including those on average performance by system in a firm‘s own industry, are significant.  
5.5.2 Alternatives to the Learning Hypothesis 
Our  results  may  be  interpreted  without  reference  to  learning.  One  possibility  is  that 
switching to a more complex system is due to an increase in the availability of relevant resources. 
We  test  for  the  resource  availability  hypothesis  by  testing  the  significance  of  the  lag  of  firm 
performance  in  levels  in  the  regression  of  equation  (1),  and  testing  whether  the  inclusion  of 
performance in levels affects the estimated learning effects. The results, available upon request, 
show that lagged firm performance has no significant impact on switching decisions, and that 
controlling for it does not change the effects of the proxies for learning about the match, learning-
by-doing and social learning.  
Another  possibility  is  that  the  differential  adoption  trends  across  systems  observed  in 
Figure 1 is pure firm heterogeneity and the variables we used to capture learning actually capture 
firm fixed effects. If this were so, the effects of these variables should disappear in  fixed-effect 
estimations of equation (1).  In fact, we find that the fixed-effects estimates of previous-period   19 
changes in performance, experience with the system and lagged average performance under system 
H (of firms in the firm‘s own industry) are similar or slightly larger in magnitude, with larger 
standard errors as compared to the OLS estimates. Due to the greater standard errors, previous-
period change in performance is not significant in the fixed-effects estimations but experience with 
the  system  and  lagged  average  performance  under  system  H  remain  significant.  Overall,  the 
proxies for learning-by-doing and social learning effects are still important after controlling for 
firm heterogeneity.  
There are complementary factors that also affect productivity and workplace organization, 
including computerization, production technology and business strategy (Bartel, Ichniowski and 
Shaw, 2005). Learning about organizational capabilities is also likely to affect the decision to 
complement  the  change  in  workplace  organization  with  computerization  and  customized 
production strategies. The matching argument implicitly assumes that organizational capabilities 
are positively correlated with decisions of computerization and customized production (or that the 
benefits of the combination of computerization, customized production and the high-performance 
system are greater for higher-capability firms). Empirical testing of this claim requires longitudinal 
information  on  computerization,  production  technologies  and  business  strategy  decisions  in 
addition to the firm‘s choice of system, which we do not have. However, the survey contains 
information about the level of complexity of core employees‘ tasks. We do find a strong significant 
positive effect of task complexity on the likelihood of choosing a more complex system after 
running either a multinomial logit for the likelihood of choosing the traditional, intermediate or 
high-performance systems or an ordered logit (controlling for industry, unionization and firm size). 




  How do firms learn about what adjustments they need and can make in the organization 
structure of their workplace? Investigating changes that a sample of firms made in the allocation of 
decision-making rights and financial incentives during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, a 
period  of  transformation  of  the  American  workplace,  we  find  that  organizational  learning  is 
multifaceted  and  that  firms  rely  on  multiple  sources  of  information  to  make  their  decisions: 
learning-by-doing,  learning  about  the  match,  and  social  learning  all  play  significant  roles  in 
explaining a firm‘s likelihood of switching to a more complex system. The pattern of adjustments 
reflects discriminating use of private and public information as well as networking opportunities. 
Information about a firm‘s own performance matters most for switching out of the intermediate 
systems to the high-performance system, whereas information about other firms is more relevant to 
firms when they consider switching out of the traditional system.    20 
Our findings are consistent with the possibility that the switch from the traditional system 
into the intermediate systems is often part of a planned subsequent switch to the high-performance 
system. The switch into the intermediate systems of decision-making and financial incentives is 
explained primarily by firms‘ geographic location: the closer firms with the traditional system are 
to other firms, to the metropolitan center, or to firms that have the high-performance system, the 
more likely they are to switch. This suggests that social learning about more complex systems is 
important  in  managers‘  decision-making,  with  some  weight  attached  to  their  firm‘s  recent 
performance. However, the switch from the intermediate systems to the high-performance system 
is based on experience with the current system and on favorable performance signals, and on the 
average performance of firms that already have the high-performance system.  
This two-stage progression of systems reveals use of different information sets at different 
decision junctures. The initial decision to switch out of the traditional system is based on social 
learning, primarily through networks of local knowledge in firms and other institutions, with some 
positive signals about organizational capabilities, whereas the second and final switch is based on 
the receipt of further positive information about a firm‘s own organizational capabilities, as well as 
about  recent  favorable  performance  of  firms  that  have  already  the  high-performance  system. 
Caution in the face of uncertainty may be one reason for this pattern, but there are other factors that 
may contribute to it. In particular, mid-level management and some unions may resist change they 
regard  as  adverse  to  their  interests,  and  future  research  should  address  its  role  in  relation  to 
learning.
22  
A natural extension of  our  analysis  would be  to estimate the comparative benefits of 
different learning mechanisms. We did compare performance outcomes of firms before and after a 
change of system and those who did not change systems at all a nd found that firms that remained 
under the traditional system throughout the period have flatter experience -performance profiles 
than  firms  that  remained  with  the  high -performance  system,  but  our  dataset  did  not  allow 
estimation of learning curves across systems and firms to understand in detail the combined effects 
of  the  three  learning  mechanisms  on  performance.  Future  research  should  emphasize  the 
performance dynamics of firms following different system adjustment paths.  
 
                                                 
22 In our analyses we controlled for unionization status (estimates on control variables were not reported in the 
tables nor discussed in the text). Unionization has a positive impact on the likelihood of introduction of more 
complex organizational systems.   21 
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Table 1: Patterns of Change (Transitions) in Organizational Systems 
 
       
















Note: St-1 represents the type of system at t-1; St  is the system in t. Observations reflecting no change in system between two consecutive years are 
presented in grey on the diagonal.
St 
St-1 







  No.  %  No.  %  No.  %  No.  %  No.  % 
Traditional  313 
 
87.19  32  8.91  8  2.23  6  1.67  359  100.00 
Financial incentives  0 
 
0.00  226  90.76  0  0.00  23  9.24  249  100.00 
Decision-making   1 
 
2.22  0  0.00  36  80.00  8  17.78  45  100.00 
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Table 2: Logit Estimation of Changes to a More Complex System (from T, D, or F to H, or from T to D or F) vs. 
No Change in System or Change to a Less Complex System
a 
                                                       
a The dependent variable is 1 for changing to system H from T, D, or F or to system F from T or to system D from T. The dependent variable is 0 for no change in system or a  
change to system T from system H, D, or F or to system F from H or to system D from H. Note that there are no changes from system D to system F and vice versa. The coef- 
ficients reported correspond to marginal effects. Marginal effects for the nonlinear terms were computed following Ai and Norton (2003) using procedure „predictnl‟ in Stata.   
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***= 1% level of significance. **=5% level of significance. *=10% level of significance. Number of observations is 631. 
b Also includes union and industry dummies, cubic functions of lagged firm size, firm age (unless system experience is used), and year. 
c Performance is measured using the firm‟s returns on investment, computed relative to average returns in the firm‟s own industry. 





















          
 
All learning mechanisms 
         





































Experience with system T  -0.0012              -0.0017  -0.0013 
  (0.0016)              (0.0014)  (0.0015) 
(Experience with system T)
2  0.00005*              0.00009*  0.00006* 
  (0.0000)              (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Experience with system F  -0.0071**              -0.0073**  -0.0053* 
  (0.003)              (0.003)  (0.003) 
(Experience with system F)
2  0.0006***              0.0007***  0.0004*** 
  (0.0000)              (0.0000)  (0.0.000) 
Experience with system D  -0.0084              -0.012  -0.004 
  (0.010)              (0.010)  (0.011) 
(Experience with system D)
2  0.0014**              0.002***  0.007*** 
  (0.0004)              (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
Lagged relative performance
c (Change)    0.035**            0.035*  0.037* 
    (0.018)            (0.019)  (0.019) 
Distance from Minneapolis (log)      -0.014*          -0.013  -0.010 
      (0.008)          (0.009)  (0.009) 
Total distance from other firms (log)        -0.035*           
        (0.022)           
Lagged system distribution
d
                   
    Proportion in system F          -0.122  -0.028  0.420  -0.071  -0.002 
          (0.282)  (0.056)  (1.251)  (0.298)  (0.053) 
    Proportion in system D          -0.662  -0.107  2.838  -0.753*  -0.103 
          (0.453)  (0.092)  (1.743)  (0.426)  (0.113) 
    Proportion in system H          -0.193  -0.172  -0.418  -0.361  -0.128 
          (0.369)  (0.192)  (1.320)  (0.376)  (0.091) 
Lagged average performance
d                    
    Performance system T          -0.081  -0.011  -0.206  -0.060  -0.009 
          (0.173)  (0.050)  (0.201)  (0.160)  (0.047) 
    Performance system F          -0.138  -0.180***  0.032  -0.136  -0.155*** 
          (0.138)  (0.064)  (0.154)  (0.137)  (0.057) 
    Performance system D          -0.067  -0.065  0.191  -0.046  0.022 
          (0.091)  (0.043)  (0.152)  (0.069)  (0.049) 
    Performance system H          0.340**  0.271***  -0.112  0.328**  0.233*** 
          (0.155)  (0.086)  (0.184)  (0.147)  (0.085) 
    LR Chi2  
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Table 3: Multinomial Estimation of the Choice of Organizational System 
 
Decisions:  Switch out of traditional 
system
a 








D or F 
To system H  To system H 
Learning By Doing 








  (0.002)  (0.003)   
    (Firm age)
2  0.000  -0.000  . 
  (0.0000)  (0.000)   
    Experience with system T  .  .  -0.000 
      (0.002) 
    (Experience with system T)
2  .  .  -0.0000 
      (0.0000) 
    Experience with system F  .  .  -0.016*** 
      (0.005) 
    (Experience with system F)
2  .  .  0.0023*** 
      (0.000) 
    Experience with system D  .  .  -0.020 
      (0.014) 
    (Experience with system D)
2  .  .  0.0042*** 










  (0.021)  (0.001)  (0.020) 
Social Learning 







  (0.016)  (0.002)  (0.011) 
Lagged system distribution
f
       
    Proportion in system F  -0.328  0.009  0.279 
  (0.381)  (0.044)  (0.424) 
    Proportion in system D  -0.793  0.075  -0.037 
  (0.712)  (0.103)  (0.739) 
    Proportion in system H  -0.253  -0.077  0.074 
  (0.671)  (0.121)  (0.535) 
Lagged average performance
f
       
    Performance system T  0.171  -0.032  -0.094 
  (0.239)  (0.041)  (0.164) 
    Performance system F  0.196  -0.049  -0.077 
  (0.335)  (0.034)  (0.160) 
    Performance system D  -0.430  -0.015  -0.042 
  (0.277)  (0.055)  (0.064) 
    Performance system H  0.065  0.115*  0.285 







     N  358  294 
                                                       
a Multinomial estimations such that the base outcome corresponds to no system change.  
b Due to the very small number or absence of observations on changes back to the traditional system (from system H or from systems D or F), the choice 
model in this case is estimated using a logit with two outcomes: no change (in systems D or F) or switch to system H. 
c The estimation includes union and industry dummies, cubic functions of lagged firm size, firm age (unless system experience is used), and year. 
Marginal effects for the non linear terms were computed following Ai and Norton (2003) using procedure „predictnl‟ in Stata.  Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. ***= 1% level of significance. **=5% level of significance. *=10% level of significance. 
d Firm age is equivalent to experience with the traditional system for firms currently in system T.  
e Performance is measured using the firm‟s returns on investment, computed relative to average returns in the firm‟s industry. 
f Distribution and average performance of firms in the firm‟s own industry.   29 
Table 4: Learning-by-Doing Effects
a 
Performance Dynamics by System 
 
Dependent Variable: Return on Investment (ROI) 
 
 
   
Sample of  non-changers and 




b  Sys T  Sys H  Sys F 
 







  (0.010)  (0.018)  (0.014) 
(Experience with system)
2  0.000  -0.002*  0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
R
2  0.17  0.10  0.11 













                                                       
a Only observations for firms that did not change systems, and post system change for firms that did change system. Observations before a system change are 
excluded because they reflect an abandoned system. 
b All regressions include a union dummy, year dummies for 1980–1994, industry dummies, and firm size. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***= 1% 
level of significance. **=5% level of significance. *=10% level of significance. 
c There no observations of non-changers in the decision-making system and too few observations of changers to this system, and therefore the results for system D 
are not shown.  




Figure 3: Predicted Performance Profiles  
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Table A: Summary Statistics  
 
  All Firms  Public Firms 
Variable  Mean  Std. 
Errors  Mean  Std. 
Errors 
Firm characteristics         
Firm age (years in business)  33.91  0.31  28.32  0.97 
Firm size (number of employees)  306.93  17.84  1351.85  141.57 
Publicly traded statue (dummy)  0.22  0.00  1.00  0.00 
Unionization (dummy)  0.22  0.00  0.20  0.01 
Manufacturing (dummy)  0.46  0.01  0.71  0.02 
Trade (dummy)  0.35  0.01  0.15  0.01 
Service (dummy)  0.20  0.00  0.14  0.01 
Average real wage (first year in sample)  18044.05  129.21  23485.29  528.74 
Distance to Minneapolis  38.75  0.71  20.96  1.40 
Distance from Other Firms   45524.34  430.19  36141.99  808.90 
Experience with system         
Experience with traditional system   24.90  0.31  20.58  0.87 
Experience with decision-making system   1.61  0.05  1.88  0.14 
Experience with financial incentives system   5.48  0.10  4.34  0.30 
Experience with high-performance system  1.92  0.08  1.52  0.23 
Performance measures         
ROI      .006  .01 
Relative ROI      .072  .01 
Lagged relative ROI level       .079  .01 
Lagged relative ROI change      -.013  .01 
Number of observations  7896    855   
Number of firms  690    110   
 
Sample size – publicly-traded firms 
Table A provides summary statistics for the sample with non-missing information on the ROI variable. The sample size with all 
observations on firm characteristics including the performance measure ROI is 855 observations (110 firms). For the analysis in 
Table 2 we dropped observations on firms in the high-performance system after a switch to that system throughout the remaining 
of the sample period and excluded firms that started with the high-performance system and kept it throughout the entire period. 
Given that for these firms there is no higher performance system to switch to, we drop them from the analysis ;the sample size 
drops to 631 observations. For the analyses in Table 3, the dataset is divided into the sample of firms with the traditional system 
(784  observations)  and  the  sample  of  firms  with  either  the  decision-making  system  or  financial  incentives  system  (662 
observations).  For  the  matching  analysis  these  two  samples  drop  in  size  because  we  use  the  second  lag  of  changes  in  the 
performance for ROI, so the final number of observations is 358.  
 